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11 Introduction
We investigate the macroeconomic implications of pursuing ￿nancial stability within a ￿ exible
in￿ ation-targeting framework. Flexible in￿ ation-targeting allows a central bank to pursue addi-
tional objectives such as output stabilization and ￿nancial stability when setting interest rates; see
e.g. Svensson (1999).
There are two main views on how ￿nancial stability can be promoted under an in￿ ation-
targeting regime. The conventional view is that an in￿ ation-targeting central bank should respond
to variables linked to ￿nancial stability to the extent they a⁄ect (observed and expected) in￿ ation
and/or output; see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Bean (2004). It is argued that stabil-
ization of in￿ ation and output provides a substantial contribution to ￿nancial stability as well.
An abrupt unwinding of asset price misalignment or ￿nancial imbalances may, however, lead to
￿nancial instability and, as a consequence, macroeconomic instability. In such a scenario, ￿nancial
and macroeconomic stability could be taken into account by choosing a longer target horizon than
out of concern for in￿ ation and output stabilization alone; see e.g. Bean (2004).
The alternative view favors a more activist or precautionary approach, assuming that a mon-
etary policy response to in￿ ation and output may not be su¢ cient to achieve ￿nancial stability.
Hence, a direct response to variables a⁄ecting or representing ￿nancial stability is advocated for
precautionary reasons. It is argued that imbalances in ￿nancial markets and asset prices may well
develop in situations with stability in in￿ ation and output. Thus, monetary policy may not re-
spond su¢ ciently to secure ￿nancial stability when ￿nancial imbalances or bubbles in asset prices
are building up; see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002) and White (2006).1 A subsequent correction
in asset prices, and hence a fall in collateral values, may reduce lending, which may give rise to
unfavorable boom-bust cycles in investment and output; see e.g. Bordo and Jeanne (2002). Fur-
thermore, a fall in bank shareholders￿wealth and a possible credit crunch, if banks become more
risk adverse, may have a strong negative impact on output; see e.g. Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
and Bernanke and Gertler (1995). If the underlying development triggers a ￿nancial crisis, the
costs in the form of both ￿nancial costs and output losses may be high; see e.g. Aziz et al. (2000),
Bordo et al. (2001), Hoggarth et al. (2002) and Schwierz (2004).
To examine the merits of the two views, we characterize monetary policy in two di⁄erent ways.
In order to model monetary policy in line with the activist approach, we characterize monetary
policy by a simple Taylor (type) rule that is augmented with two indicators representing excess
￿nancial vulnerability. In addition to contributing to ￿nancial stability, an extended Taylor (type)
rule may perform better than a simple Taylor rule in terms of in￿ ation and output stability for
1Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that a credible in￿ation-targeting regime may produce low in￿ation, credit growth
and booming asset prices. Firstly, a stable economic environment may spur optimism about the future that leads to
booming asset markets. Secondly, improvements in the supply side and labor market may put a downward pressure
on consumer prices at the same time as asset prices grow steeply.
2two main reasons.
First, the interest rate response may become better attuned to the shocks behind ￿ uctuations
in output and in￿ ation. Ideally, the interest rate response should be shock-dependent, as suggested
by the literature on optimal monetary policy rules. An interest rate rule that only admits response
to in￿ ation and output gaps may imply an interest rate response that is in disproportion to the
e⁄ects of a shock behind movements in the in￿ ation and/or output gap. An optimization of the
weights in a simple Taylor type rule may alleviate but not eliminate this weakness. However,
by augmenting it with additional variables, the interest rate response can become closer to that
implied by an optimal rule suggesting shock-dependent response to all shocks.
And secondly, an augmented Taylor rule can give a head start on restraining the in￿ ationary
and/or expansionary e⁄ects of the shocks relative to a simple Taylor rule that is outcome based. In
contrast with an augmented Taylor rule, the simple Taylor rule will not prescribe an interest rate
response until e⁄ects of the shock become re￿ ected in in￿ ation and/or output. Essentially, under
an augmented Taylor rule, the e⁄ects of an interest rate response can become more synchronized
with e⁄ects of shocks and hence it can prove more stabilizing than the simple rule. However, if the
transmission lags of e⁄ects from interest rates to key variables are shorter than those from shocks
to the key variables, an augmented Taylor rule need not outperform the simple rule. In such
cases, the simple rule can provide stabilizing impulses to the economy that are more synchronized
with the destabilizing impulses from the shocks. Hence, the ranking of an augmented Taylor rule
relative to the simple Taylor rule may be shock- and model-dependent.2
In order to model monetary policy in line with the conventional approach, we characterize mon-
etary policy by interest rate rules that specify shock- and horizon-speci￿c interest rate response to
shocks. That is, they prescribe an interest rate response in proportion to the expected in￿ ationary
e⁄ects of a shock. And, output and/or ￿nancial stability are taken into account by choosing the ho-
rizon that balances these objectives with the objective of in￿ ation stability. Thus, such rules allow
one to choose a policy horizon that better synchronizes the e⁄ects of the interest rate response and
those of a given shock to key variables a⁄ecting the policy maker￿ s objective function. Accordingly,
a relatively long horizon may be preferred if the e⁄ects of a shock on in￿ ation, aggregate demand
and/or indicators of ￿nancial stability build up gradually, while a relatively short horizon may be
chosen if the e⁄ects appear without much delay. We are particularly interested in investigating the
e⁄ect of taking into account ￿nancial stability on the optimal horizon. The details of the derivation
of such rules can be found in Akram (2006).
We implement both types of interest rate rules in a version of a well documented econometric
model for Norway; see e.g. B￿rdsen and Nymoen (2001) and B￿rdsen, Jansen, and Nymoen (2003)
and B￿rdsen et al. (2005). The main properties of the model are set out in the Appendix. Brie￿ y,
2The two arguments favoring an augmented Taylor rule relative to a simple outcome-based Taylor rule loose
strength in the case of forecast based Taylor rules, though; see Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003).
3the model explicitly takes into account several channels of interplay between asset prices, credit,
output and in￿ ation. Besides equations for aggregate demand and in￿ ation, the model includes
equations for house prices, the nominal exchange rate, households￿debt growth and the bankruptcy
rate for domestic ￿rms. These variables are often considered to be among key determinants of
￿nancial stability. The model includes two measures of ￿nancial stability that are functions of the
bankruptcy rate of ￿rms and the debt burden of households.
We evaluate the performance of the di⁄erent interest rate rules in the face of shocks to house
prices and credit growth. These shocks can be interpreted as demand shocks. In general, there is
no con￿ ict between in￿ ation and output stability in the case of demand shocks. We may therefore
focus on the outcomes in terms of ￿nancial stability versus those in terms of in￿ ation and output
stability. In the case of supply shocks, however, a trade-o⁄ may also emerge between in￿ ation and
output, which may complicate the analysis.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 de￿nes a ￿ exible in￿ ation-targeting regime and presents an
operational de￿nition of ￿nancial stability. Section 3 characterizes the monetary policy in terms
of the augmented Taylor rule and evaluates its performance relative to that of a simple Taylor
rule. Section 4 presents a simple shock- and horizon-speci￿c interest rate rule that can be used
to characterize the conventional view and investigate its implications for ￿nancial stability in
particular. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. Finally, the Appendix lays out a stylized version
of the model used.
2 Flexible in￿ ation-targeting and ￿nancial stability
We assume that the central bank has the following objective function:
L(￿;￿) = V (Inf) + ￿V (ygap) + ￿V (f), (1)
where V (Inf) denotes the variance of the (underlying) in￿ ation rate, while ￿ and ￿ express mon-
etary authorities￿aversion to variation in output gap V (ygap) and in an indicator of ￿nancial
stability V (f). Often, f is equated with changes in interest rates and motivated by concern for
￿nancial stability. However, our model allows us to employ a more appropriate measure of ￿nancial
stability as explained below.
A ￿ exible in￿ ation-targeting regime can be de￿ned by ￿ > 0 and/or ￿ > 0, while a strict
in￿ ation-targeting regime can be de￿ned by ￿ = ￿ = 0; see Svensson (1999). The performance
of di⁄erent simple interest rate rules can be evaluated under di⁄erent choices of these preference
parameters. This is particularly useful when choosing among interest rate rules that have widely
di⁄erent e⁄ects on in￿ ation, output and ￿nancial stability. In particular, it is of interest to invest-
igate how concern for ￿nancial stability, i.e. ￿ > 0, would a⁄ect the choice of an interest rate rule
4characterizing monetary policy.
2.1 Financial stability indicators
There seems to be no consensus on an operational de￿nition of ￿ ￿nancial stability￿in the literature;
see B￿rdsen, Lindquist, and Tsomocos (2007) for a discussion of alternative de￿nitions. Tsomocos
(2003) and Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006) argue that an operational de￿nition should
use information on the probability of default for banks, households and ￿rms, together with bank
pro￿tability. The focus on banks is motivated by their importance for ￿nancial stability due to
their dominant role as ￿nancial intermediaries and providers of payment services. An operational
de￿nition of ￿nancial stability along the recommended line, would allow one to study ￿nancial
instability as a continuous economic state rather than merely as an extreme economic state or
phenomenon. This makes such a de￿nition more useful, since information on changes in the
vulnerability of the ￿nancial system is normally of higher value to a policy maker, than information
on whether the economy is in one of the two states: ￿nancial crisis ￿not ￿nancial crisis. In addition,
such a de￿nition can be applied at both disaggregated and aggregated levels.
We include an operational de￿nition of ￿nancial stability in our model that is closely related
to the de￿nition suggested by Goodhart et al. (2006). Default of households and ￿rms, as well as
banks￿losses and pro￿ts, are closely related to households￿and ￿rms￿debt-servicing capacities. We
represent the debt-servicing capacity of households by their debt ratio, i.e. debt relative to income.
Households￿debt ratio has been found important for banks￿losses and the severity of a ￿nancial
crisis by e.g. Barrell, Davis, and Pomerantz (2004). In particular, households￿indebtedness may
amplify and prolong a ￿nancial crisis. In order to represent the debt servicing capacity of ￿rms, we
use their bankruptcy rate rather than their debt ratio, which is not represented in our model. More
importantly, the debt ratio may be less informative about ￿rms￿debt servicing capacity, since the
debt ratio often depends on ￿rms￿strategic considerations regarding the equity-to-assets ratio and
return on net capital. Both the households￿debt ratio and ￿rms￿bankruptcy rate appear more
appropriate indicators of ￿nancial stability than e.g. ￿ uctuations in interest rates, which are often
used as an indicator of ￿nancial stability in academic studies.
In the next section, we augment a simple Taylor (type) rule with these two indicators of
￿nancial stability: households￿debt ratio and ￿rms￿bankruptcy rate. More precisely, households￿
debt ratio (DR) is calculated as households￿debt divided by cumulative wage income over the last
four quarters. Usually, households￿debt ratio is calculated using disposable income, which is not
de￿ned in our model. Therefore, we adjust the debt ratio based on wage income to equal the debt
ratio based on disposable income in 2004q4. The second indicator, ￿rms￿bankruptcy rate (BR) is
de￿ned as the quarterly number of bankruptcies as a percentage of the number of ￿rms.
Alternatively, one can develop a single ￿nancial stability indicator as a function of these two
5indicators. It is, however, not obvious how one should weigh these two indicators to derive the
combined indicator, because an increase in households￿debt ratio and ￿rms￿bankruptcy rate may
have widely di⁄erent implications for monetary policy.
In our model, monetary policy should be contractionary if the debt ratio rises, while policy
should be expansionary if the bankruptcy rate increases. In the latter case, the ￿nancial state
of ￿rms may improve by increasing domestic and foreign demand for their products through its
expansionary e⁄ect at home and by strengthening their competitiveness through an exchange
rate depreciation, respectively; see the Appendix. A contractionary monetary policy response to
an increase in households￿debt ratio helps reigning their debt ratio by reducing the demand for
credit. Thus, such a monetary policy response reduces their debt burden and probability of default
and thereby contributes to ￿nancial stability. However, since the interest rate would a⁄ect both
the nominator (credit) and the denominator (income) of the debt ratio, the dampening e⁄ect of
monetary policy on the debt ratio would be less than the dampening e⁄ect on credit growth.
It can also be argued that the two indicators should enter the interest rate rule in a non-
linear way and a⁄ect interest rates only when they are particularly high. This is in line with
the common argument that households￿debt ratio and/or ￿rms￿bankruptcy rate should a⁄ect
monetary policy only when they are high, while a normal increase or decline in these measures;
e.g. during business cycles, do not call for a policy response. Nevertheless, in order to assess the
contribution of the augmented Taylor rule relative to that of the Taylor rule, one would need to
consider its performance when the terms added are active. Hence, for the purpose of comparing
their performances, it does not add much to make the ￿nancial stability indicators enter in a
non-linear fashion.
3 The precautionary approach
In this section, we present and evaluate the performance of a Taylor (type) interest rate rule
that is augmented with the ￿nancial stability indicators. The augmented Taylor rule represents a
monetary policy that responds directly to variables a⁄ecting ￿nancial stability, and hence represents
features of a precautionary monetary policy regime. Both of the two rules are de￿ned by constant
response coe¢ cients whose values are chosen for illustrational purposes. However, the results that
follow remained qualitatively the same when we simulated the models with numerous alternative
values of the response coe¢ cients in both rules.
Equations (2) and (3) present the simple Taylor rule and the augmented Taylor rule, respect-
ively; see e.g. Taylor (1993). Both rules allow for interest rate smoothing. The interest rate is
represented by the 3-month nominal market interest rate (r). The in￿ ation gap (Infgap) is de￿ned
as the (actual) deviation between the core in￿ ation and the in￿ ation target, which is 2.5 per cent
6annualized. The growth in output gap (￿ygap) is de￿ned as the deviation in annual growth in
Mainland-GDP (GDP excluding oil, gas and shipping) from potential growth, which is assumed to
be 2.5 per cent.3 The weights on the in￿ ation gap, the growth in output gap and lagged interest
rate are set equal to: 1.5, 0.5 and 1, respectively. This is consistent with ￿ndings in Levin, Wieland
and Williams (1999).
rt = rt￿1 + 0:5￿ygapt + 1:5Infgapt (2)








In Equation (3), the Taylor rule is augmented with the two ￿nancial stability indicators: ￿rms￿
bankruptcy rate (BR) and households￿debt ratio (DR). We have scaled down the two indicators
to make a concession to the empirical fact that, historically, banks have su⁄ered signi￿cantly higher
losses on their lending to ￿rms than on their lending to households. Thus, BR is adjusted by 2/3,
while DR is adjusted by 1/3 to re￿ ect the unequal distribution of losses. This distribution of
losses re￿ ects both the debt-servicing capacity of ￿rms and households and the degree of loss given
default. In line with the arguments in the previous section, their response coe¢ cients are set at
￿ 0.025 and 0.025, respectively.
To examine the impact of responding directly to the two ￿nancial stability indicators, we
provide (separately) a house price shock and a credit shock to the model, and simulate it with
the two alternative interest rate rules over 40 quarters in each case. In both cases, the shock
is transitory and designed to build up over a year. Compared with the baseline scenario, house
prices and households￿credit demand are assumed to increase by 2.5 per cent, 5 per cent, 7.5 per
cent and 10 per cent in the ￿rst, second, third and fourth quarter, respectively. Figures 1 and 3
present the results of the simulations as percentage deviations from their reference values (under
no shocks). For simplicity, in Figures 1 and 3, the two ￿nancial stability indicators, BR and DR,
are represented by a single ￿￿nancial stability indicator￿ , which is de￿ned as: ￿2=3BR + 1=3DR.
This combined indicator does not re￿ ect the state of ￿nancial stability, but rather the net impulse
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Figure 1 Policy implications and results (over 40 quarters) when there is a transitory increase in
house prices by 10% that builds up over four uarters. Solid lines: The outcomes under the Taylor
rule (relative to the baseline scenario). Dotted lines: The outcomes under the augmented Taylor ule
(relative to the baseline scenario). The ￿nancial stability indicator s de￿ned as ￿2=3BR+1=3DR.
3.1 House price shock
In the case of a house price shock, the impulse to monetary policy comes indirectly from an e⁄ect
on credit growth, output and in￿ ation; see the Appendix. House prices a⁄ect credit growth through
an e⁄ect on collateral values, and output through a wealth e⁄ect on demand. The e⁄ect on output
then contributes to higher in￿ ation and, due to increased employment, higher income. The latter
reduces the debt ratio (DR), which is raised by the credit growth.
Figure 1 shows that both rules induce higher interest rates due to the rise in output growth
and in￿ ation. This brings in￿ ation and output growth down (and consequently interest rates).
Higher interest rates trigger an appreciation of the real exchange rate, however, which weakens
the competitiveness of domestic ￿rms. As a consequence, the bankruptcy rate (BR) increases and
outweighs the favorable e⁄ect on the bankruptcy rate of the rise in domestic demand and output.
The increase in the bankruptcy rate causes the combined ￿nancial stability indicator to fall in the
medium run; see Figure 1. In the long run, the development in the ￿nancial stability indicator is
driven by the increase in the debt ratio. Under the augmented Taylor rule, the higher bankruptcy
rate contributes to lower interest rates.
3It is more common to formulate the Taylor rule with the output gap rather than growth in the output gap.
However, in addition to the inherent possibility of measurement error in the output gap, as argued by Orphanides
(2003), empirical evidence from Norwegian data suggests that an interest rate rule with growth in the output gap
captures the actual behavior of short-term interest rates better than a rule with the output gap; see Bernhardsen
and B￿rdsen (2004).
8The augmented Taylor rule seems to deliver a better performance in terms of in￿ ation stability,
and to some extent in terms of output stability, in the long run. The short- to medium-run e⁄ects
of the two rules on in￿ ation and output growth are comparable. Overall, however, there do not
seem to be obvious gains in terms of ￿nancial stability by responding directly to the ￿nancial
stability indicators.
Table 1 Performance of the two Taylor type rules
I. House price shock
Std. deviations of: BR DR r ygap Infgap
Taylor rule 0.0112 1.68 0.33 1.37 0.019
Augmented Taylor rule 0.0115 1.63 0.33 1.25 0.013
II. Credit shock
Std. deviations of: BR DR r ygap Infgap
Taylor rule 0.0017 2.20 0.03 0.11 0.002
Augmented Taylor rule 0.0039 2.37 0.07 0.33 0.013
Table 1 summarizes the results in terms of the standard deviations of the two ￿nancial stability
indicators, interest rates, output gap and in￿ ation. Panel I records the performance of the two rules
in the face of the house price shock. We note the relative superior performance of the augmented
Taylor rule in terms of the output gap, in￿ ation and the debt ratio. However, the bankruptcy rate
￿ uctuates relatively more under the augmented rule, mainly because of larger ￿ uctuations in the
exchange rate due to a more activist monetary policy. The latter e⁄ect is especially important in
the case of the credit shock, which is examined in the next subsection and in panel II of Table 1.
Figure 2 evaluates the performance of the augmented Taylor rule relative to the Taylor rule
for di⁄erent preference parameters ￿ 2 [0; 2] and ￿ 2 [0; 2]. It presents relative values of the
loss-functions, LR(.), which are the ratios of the loss-function values under the augmented Taylor
rule to the corresponding values under the simple Taylor rule. Thus, for a speci￿c pair of ￿ and ￿, a
value of the relative loss function (LR(.)) below 1 indicates that the performance of the augmented
rule is considered superior to that of the Taylor rule, while a value above 1 indicates the opposite.
The values of the loss-functions are obtained by weighting their performance recorded in Table
1 by numerous combinations of the preference parameters in the 0￿ 2 space. For simplicity, both
of the two indicators have been attached equal importance in the loss-functions, i.e. the same ￿
value.
It appears that the performance of the augmented Taylor rule would be considered superior to
that of the Taylor rule for all combinations of the preference parameters considered; see Figure
2. This is especially the case when the concern for output stabilization is high. The augmented
Taylor rule can be considered less successful if the policy maker is largely indi⁄erent to output






















Figure 2 Relative loss-function for ￿ 2 [0;2] and ￿ 2 [0; 2] under the house price shock. The
relative loss function LR(:) is the ratio of the loss-function under the augmented Taylor rule relative
to that of the Taylor rule.
This re￿ ects that the gains from the augmented rule are mainly in terms of output stability.
3.2 Credit shock
In the case of the credit shock, the two interest rate rules have widely di⁄erent implications for
interest rates and the economy; see Figure 3. Credit growth contributes to a higher level of activity
and output growth in the economy, which leads to higher in￿ ation. Credit growth also raises the
debt ratio; the direct e⁄ect on the nominator (debt) clearly dominates that on the denominator
(income). Higher output and in￿ ation contribute to raising interest rates under both rules, and
this has a stabilizing e⁄ect on particularly output and in￿ ation.
Under the augmented rule, however, the increase in the debt ratio leads to relatively high
interest rates over most of the simulation period and especially in the short run. This have relatively
large contractionary e⁄ects on output and in￿ ation. The contractionary e⁄ect on output dominates
the expansionary e⁄ect of the initial credit shock, and, as a consequence, output growth falls in the
short run. After about four years, however, output growth becomes positive and converges with
its long-run rate. The e⁄ects on in￿ ation are quite strong. In contrast to a low in￿ ation under the
simple rule, the augmented rule leads to a strong de￿ ation over most of the simulation period.
However, the relatively strong contractionary policy and its e⁄ects lowers the (combined) ￿n-
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Figure 3 Policy implications and results (over 40 quarters) when there is a ransitory increase in
households￿credit demand by 10% that builds up over our quarters. Solid lines: The outcomes
under the Taylor rule (relative to he baseline scenario). Dotted lines: The outcomes under the
augmented Taylor rule (relative to the baseline scenario). Here, the ￿nancial stability indicator is
de￿ned as ￿2=3BR + 1=3DR..
thereafter the debt ratio. The initial increase in interest rates also leads to a stronger nominal
exchange rate, and hence a stronger real exchange rate, and recession. Thus, the bankruptcy rate
of ￿rms becomes higher. Therefore, the increase in the ￿nancial stability indicator is reversed
relatively fast under the augmented Taylor rule compared with the simple Taylor rule. As a result,
the interest rate under the augmented rule falls below the interest rate implied by the simple rule
in the medium run; see Figure 3.
In sum, the augmented Taylor rule turns out to induce relatively higher volatility in all of
the key variables examined; see panel II of Table 1. Both of the ￿nancial stability indicators,
particularly the bankruptcy ratio, as well as in￿ ation and output gap become more volatile than
under the simple rule. Clearly, the performance of the augmented Taylor rule will be considered
inferior to that of the simple Taylor rule for all values of the preference parameters ￿ and ￿.
4 The conventional approach
In this section, we characterize the conventional approach of incorporating concern for objectives
such as output stabilization and ￿nancial stability via the choice of the target horizon. We assume
that the principal objective of monetary policy is to ensure an in￿ ation rate close to its target
rate (in the near future). Accordingly, output stability and ￿nancial stability can be considered
11as secondary objectives.4 This implies that the central bank minimizes the loss function (1) with
respect to interest rate paths that bring in￿ ation close to its target after speci￿ed periods.
If the model is linear and interest rate smoothing is possible, an interest rate rule that would
bring in￿ ation close to its target in about H periods can be speci￿ed as follows:5
it = i0 + (1 ￿ %H)￿""￿ + %H(it￿1 ￿ i0) ;t = ￿;￿ + 1;￿ + 2;:::: (4)
Here, i0 represents the neutral rate of the nominal interest rate. The response coe¢ cient (1 ￿
%H)￿" ￿ ￿";H determines how much the interest rate must change initially to counteract the
in￿ ationary e⁄ects of a shock "￿. This initial deviation is thereafter eliminated gradually depending
on the value of an interest rate smoothing parameter %H. H represents the policy horizon, i.e. the
number of periods during which interest rates will deviate from their reference value and stimulate
or restrain the economy. The target horizon, i.e. the number of periods it would take to bring
in￿ ation close to its target, will generally be linked and be close to the policy horizon.6 The
subscript "H" indicates that both the response coe¢ cient and the degree of smoothing depend on
the policy horizon.
The value of ￿" depends on the shock and the model. It is a derived parameter whose value
increases with the pass-through of the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of the shock, but declines with the
e⁄ectiveness of interest rates in controlling in￿ ation. It can be considered a constant (shock- and
model-speci￿c) parameter, if the transmission mechanism is super exogenous with respect to policy
changes considered; see Engle, Hendry, and Richard (1983).
The smoothing parameter %H is de￿ned as ￿
1=(H+1) and takes on a value in the range of (0; 1)
depending on the policy horizon H. The parameter ￿ is a su¢ ciently small ￿xed parameter of
choice that indicates when the interest rate may be considered converged with its reference value;
ji￿+H+1 ￿ i0j ￿ ￿ > 0.
The degree of smoothing increases with the policy horizon (H) in a concave fashion. In partic-
ular, H = 0 leads to (almost) no interest rate smoothing (%H = ￿) while large values of H imply
a high degree of interest rate smoothing, since %H = ￿
1=(H+1) ￿! 1 when H ￿! 1. The case
H = 0 refers to the case when the policy maker only allows interest rates to deviate from their
reference value in (e⁄ectively) a single period at time ￿, i.e. in the period the shock occurs.
However, the required initial response becomes stronger with a short policy horizon than with a
relatively longer policy horizon. The value of the response coe¢ cient ￿"; H (￿ (1￿%H)￿") declines
(in a geometric fashion) with the policy horizon or degree of interest rate smoothing. In particular,
4This perspective on monetary policy is consistent with what Faust and Henderson (2004) regard as best-practice
monetary policy. Accordingly, ￿...best-practice policy can be summarized in terms of two goals: First get mean
in￿ation right; second, get the variance of in￿ation right.", but ￿...getting the mean right may be the goal of greatest
importance"; see Faust and Henderson (2004, pp. 117￿ 118).
5See Akram (2006) for details.
6In a simple model, policy horizon and target horizon typically coincide. In a complex dynamic model, however,
they may usually di⁄er by some months or quarters, depending on the dynamic properties of the model used.
12￿"; H ￿ ￿" when H = 0, while ￿"; H ￿! 0 when H ￿! 1; since %H ￿! 1. This suggests that if
a very long policy horizon is allowed, the interest rate needs to deviate only marginally from its
reference value, but this deviation has to persist for a long time. A long horizon would help subdue
the required initial response to a shock. In contrast, a short horizon may imply a particularly large
deviation from the neutral interest rate level.
Clearly, the parameters characterizing the interest rate rule depend on the policy horizon, in
a given model and a given i0. Thus, by varying H, one can vary the interest rate rule and thus
the complete interest rate path. It follows that once the rule (4) is implemented in the model, the
optimal policy response to a shock can be found by minimizing the loss function (1) with respect
to the policy horizon H. The optimal value of H will de￿ne the optimal value of ￿";H as well
as the optimal degree of smoothing %H. The optimal value of H and consequently those of ￿";H
and %H will depend on the preferences for output stabilization and ￿nancial stability: ￿ and ￿,
respectively.
4.1 Implementation

























Figure 4 Left frame: Initial required interest rate response in percentage points to house price
(ph) and credit (cr) shocks, respectively, ssociated with di⁄erent policy horizons, H (horizontal
axis), in uarters. Right frame: The degree of interest rate squarters. Right frame: The degree of
interest rate smoothing associated with the di⁄erent policy horizons.
Figure 4 presents the estimated required initial responses, ￿";H, associated with di⁄erent policy
horizons in the range of 0￿ 20 quarters for both shocks. They have been obtained by simulating our
13model under the two shocks separately. Estimates of the response coe¢ cients ￿";H are obtained
from its formula: (1 ￿ %H)￿". Estimates of ￿" are obtained by taking the ratio of the in￿ ationary
e⁄ects of a given shock to the de￿ ationary e⁄ects of an interest rate shock (over the simulation
period of 40 quarters); see Akram (2006) for details. Values of %H for di⁄erent policy horizons are
obtained from %H = ￿
1=(H+1), where ￿ is set to 0.1. This implies that we would consider an interest
rate approximately equal to its reference value if it deviates not more than 1/10 of a percentage
point from the reference value. Alternative values of ￿ do not bring about substantially di⁄erent
results.
The parameter estimates in the ￿gure allow one to de￿ne 21 horizon-speci￿c interest rate rules
to characterize policy response to each of the shocks. It appears that the house price shock requires
a stronger monetary policy response than the credit shock. This re￿ ects that the in￿ ationary e⁄ects
of a house price shock are stronger than those of the credit shock. The ￿gure also shows that the
required initial response to a shock declines with the policy horizon H.
For example, if H = 0, the interest rate must be initially raised by 0.23 percentage points
(pp) if the house prices (ph) increase by 1 pp and thereafter are brought back rapidly, i.e. in the
subsequent quarter. The deviation of the interest rate from its neutral value in the subsequent
quarter will be 1/10 of the initial increase (and lower thereafter); the implied degree of smoothing
is 0.1 as shown in Figure 4. However, if e.g. H = 8, then interest rates must initially be raised
by about 0.06 pp if house prices increase by 1 pp. In this case, the implied degree of interest rate
smoothing will be 0.78. (The response to the 10% increase in house prices can be obtained by
multiplying the required initial interest rate by 10.)
4.1.1 House price shock
Figure 5 presents the outcomes of monetary policy responses to the 10 per cent transitory increase
in house prices. They have been obtained by implementing 21 di⁄erent horizon-speci￿c interest
rate rules, de￿ned by the derived parameter values for the house price shock. The outcomes are
measured in terms of standard deviations of key variables (circled lines). We also present the
standard deviations of the key variables when monetary policy is assumed to not respond to the
shock (straight crossed lines). In this case, equilibrating forces in the model bring the economy
back to its equilibrium state after the shock. This case serves as a reference case for evaluating
possible gains from responding to the shock.
The performance of an activist monetary policy depends on the policy horizon. The preferred
horizon in terms of the di⁄erent variables depends on how fast they become a⁄ected by the house
price shock. Stabilization gains increase with the degree of synchronization between the (destabil-
izing) e⁄ects of the shock and the (stabilizing) e⁄ects of an interest rate rule de￿ned by a given
policy horizon H.




















Figure 5 Outcomes of monetary policy response to the transitory house price hock of 10% that
builds up over four quarters. The outcomes are measured in standard deviations of key variables
over the simulation period of 40 quarters. Std(j) denotes the standard deviation of variable j =
Inf (in￿ ation rate), ygap (output gap), BR (bankruptcy ratio) and DR (debt ratio). Each circle
marks the outcome of an interest rate rule de￿ned by a speci￿c policy horizon (H) in the range of
0￿ 20 quarters (horizontal axis). The straight crossed lines represent the outcomes when monetary
policy is assumed to not respond to the shock.
It appears that concern for in￿ ation alone would favor a horizon of two quarters, while concern
for output would favor a horizon of a single quarter. The two ￿nancial stability indicators, however,
favor widely di⁄erent policy horizons. The debt ratio favors an aggressive response, while the
bankruptcy rate warrants a relatively long horizon, which implies a small initial interest rate
increase that is brought gradually to its neutral level over a long period.
In general, the gains from responding decline with the length of the policy horizon, because the
initial monetary policy stimulus declines, but persistence in interest rates increases (i.e. %H rises).
Thus, the bulk of e⁄ects from monetary policy on in￿ ation and output takes place later than those
of the shock. However, a too short horizon, implying an aggressive response to the house price
shock, is ine¢ cient in terms of price and output stability. This is because an overly aggressive
interest rate response would not adequately take into account the time lags from the house price
shock to its e⁄ect on in￿ ation and output in the model.
The debt ratio favors a relatively shorter horizon because house prices a⁄ect both the nomin-
ator and the denominator of the debt ratio relatively fast. House prices interact with credit growth
directly and indirectly, and a⁄ect income indirectly, through their wealth e⁄ect on aggregate de-
mand. Therefore, the main e⁄ects of house prices on the debt ratio emerge relatively fast, favoring






LR(l= 0; f= 0) · H
LR(l= 0.5; f= 0) · H
LR(l= 0.5; f= 0.5) · H
Figure 6 The vertical axis shows values of the relative loss-function, LR(:), implied by the di⁄erent
horizon-speci￿c interest rate rules and a few values of the preference parameters. The horizontal
axis shows the policy horizons identifying the associated interest rate rules.
an aggressive monetary policy stance.
With respect to the bankruptcy rate, the gains from responding to the initial shock increase
with the policy horizon. Horizons up to 7 quarters lead to more variability than in the case of
no response to the house price shock. The reason is that an increase in the interest rate to o⁄set
the house price shock has the additional consequence that the exchange rate appreciates rather
abruptly. This reduces the competitiveness of domestic ￿rms that compete with foreign ￿rms, and
the result is an increase in the bankruptcy rate due to the monetary policy response itself. The
longer the policy horizon, the smoother the interest rate path, and the less important is this e⁄ect.
Furthermore, the e⁄ects from monetary policy become better synchronized with those from the
shock itself. Thus, a longer policy horizon is favored rather than a short one.
There is generally a con￿ ict regarding the appropriate policy horizon, or the policy response,
between ￿nancial stability and stability in in￿ ation and output. This is especially the case when
￿nancial stability is de￿ned in terms of both the bankruptcy rate and the debt ratio. The optimal
policy horizon can be chosen by minimizing the linear combinations of variances for the variables
entering the loss function (1).
Figure 6 suggests that concern for output stabilization will tend to call for a shorter policy
horizon than under strict in￿ ation targeting (￿ = ￿ =0), while concern for ￿nancial stability will
call for a relatively longer policy horizon; cf. Bean (2004). The ￿gure presents values of the loss-
16function relative to its values under no-policy response under the 21 di⁄erent horizon-speci￿c rules.
Each of these rules are identi￿ed by the corresponding policy horizon (H), which is marked on
the horizontal axis. On the vertical axis, values below 1 suggest gains from responding relative to
remaining passive, while values above 1 suggest the opposite.
Speci￿cally, Figure 6 shows that the optimal policy horizon is 2 quarters under strict in￿ ation
targeting, while it is 1 quarter if ￿ is 0.5. However, if there is additional concern for ￿nancial stabil-
ity and ￿ is 0.5, the optimal horizon will be 3 quarters. We note that the values of the corresponding
(relative) loss-functions obtain their minimum values at 2, 1 and 3 quarters, respectively.
Figure 6 also shows that there are gains from an active response to the house price shock relative
to the hypothetical case of leaving the economy to adjust on its own when exposed to the house
price shock. The gains decline with an increase in the policy horizon, but less so when one cares
about ￿nancial stability.
4.1.2 Credit shock
Figure 7 presents the outcomes of monetary policy responses to the 10 per cent transitory increase
in credit to households. They have been obtained by implementing 21 di⁄erent horizon-speci￿c
interest rate rules de￿ned by the derived parameter values for the credit shock presented in Figure
4.
In general, a longer policy horizon is preferred relative to the case of the house price shock. This
is mainly because there are longer lags from credit growth to output and (via that) to in￿ ation.
These lags are longer than those from a change in the interest rate to output and in￿ ation. A
short policy horizon would therefore prove counterproductive and have a destabilizing e⁄ect on the
economy.
The explanation for favoring a long policy horizon in the case of the two ￿nancial stability
indicators di⁄ers. Speci￿cally, the bankruptcy rate is not that much a⁄ected by the higher growth
of credit to households. In comparison, an increase in the interest rate has a relatively stronger
e⁄ect on the bankruptcy rate, through e.g. exchange rate appreciation. The end result is that the
bankruptcy rate becomes more unstable with a policy response relative to the case of no response
for the policy horizons considered. A particularly long policy horizon contributes to making the
interest rate quite stable and mimics closely the case with no interest rate response. Thus at the
limit, ￿nancial stability as measured by the bankruptcy rate becomes close to that in the case of
no policy response (straight crossed lines).
In the case of the debt ratio, the nominator depends on the credit level, while the denominator
depends on the income level. An increase in the interest rate lowers both credit growth and income
growth, but with di⁄erent lags and strength; income is a⁄ected after about 6 lags as shown in the
upper right-hand chart. In sum, the debt ratio becomes more unstable with a policy response





















Figure 7 Outcomes of monetary policy response to the transitory credit shock f 10% that builds
up over four quarters. The outcomes are measured in tandard deviations of key variables over
the simulation period of 40 quarters. Std(j) denotes the standard deviation of variable j = Inf
(in￿ ation), ygap (output gap), BR (bankruptcy ratio) and DR (debt atio). Each circle marks
the outcome of an interest rate rule de￿ned by a speci￿c policy horizon (H) in the range of 0￿ 20
quarters (horizontal axis). The straight crossed lines represent the outcomes when monetary policy
is assumed to not respond to the shock.
relative to the case of no response. Hence, stabilization of the debt ratio essentially favors no
response rather than a response to the credit shock, irrespective of the policy horizon. Thus, in
contrast to the case of the house price shock, stabilization of the debt ratio favors a longer horizon
than stabilization of the bankruptcy rate.
Figure 8 illustrates the e⁄ect on the optimal policy horizon of preferences regarding output
and ￿nancial stability. In contrast to the house price shock, concerns for output stabilization and
￿nancial stability favors a relatively long horizon as in the case of strict in￿ ation targeting.
However, a su¢ cient concern for ￿nancial stability implies a no-response to the credit shock.
Figure 8 shows that when ￿ = 0.5 (and ￿ = 0.5), values of the relative loss-function remain above 1
even when an interest rate rule with policy horizon 20 quarter is chosen. Accordingly, the outcome
of the no-response policy would lead to lower losses than all of the di⁄erent horizon-speci￿c interest
rate rules. This is, however, not the case when ￿ = 0, as interest rate rules associated with relatively
long horizons outperform the no-response policy.
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Figure 8 The vertical axis shows values of the relative loss-function, LR(:), implied by the di⁄erent
horizon-speci￿c interest rate rules and a few values of the preference parameters. The horizontal
axis shows the policy horizons identifying the associated interest rate rules.
5 Summary and conclusions
We have implemented two main approaches to taking ￿nancial stability into account when con-
ducting monetary policy within a ￿ exible in￿ ation-targeting framework. We have then investigated
the implications of the two approaches for the behavior of interest rates over time, developments
in ￿nancial stability, real economic stability and in￿ ation stability.
The activist or precautionary approach towards promoting ￿nancial stability has been char-
acterized by a Taylor-type interest rate rule augmented with two ￿nancial stability indicators:
the bankruptcy rate of non-￿nancial ￿rms and the debt ratio for households. The conventional
approach has been implemented by shock- and horizon-speci￿c interest rate rules. To study the
merits of the two approaches, we have simulated a well-documented macroeconometric model of
the Norwegian economy under a house price shock and a credit shock, separately. We may draw
the following conclusions from these simulations.
Under the precautionary approach, gains or losses from responding directly to ￿nancial stability
indicators are highly shock-dependent. This is especially the case for in￿ ation and output. In
particular, there are gains in terms of in￿ ation and output stability in the case of a house price
shock, while there are costs in terms of relatively large variation in in￿ ation and output in the
case of a credit shock. The e⁄ects on the two ￿nancial stability indicators, the debt ratio and the
19bankruptcy rate, are highly shock dependent. The variance of the bankruptcy rate increases while
that of the debt ratio becomes slightly lower in the case of the house price shock. In the case of
the credit shock, however, the variances of both indicators increase substantially. Furthermore, if
we use variation in interest rates as an indicator of ￿nancial stability or fragility, there are small
gains in the case of the house price shock, but considerable costs in the case of the credit shock.
Thus, the precautionary approach prove to be counterproductive in the case of the credit shock.
Under the conventional approach, there are generally gains in terms of ￿nancial stability by
extending the policy horizon. However, the two di⁄erent indicators tend to prefer di⁄erent horizons
under the two shocks. Concern for the debt ratio of households would favor a relatively short
horizon in the case of the house price shock, but a relatively long horizon in the case of the credit
shock. In contrast, concern for the bankruptcy rate of ￿rms would favor a long horizon in the case
of both shocks.
However, if we focus on in￿ ation and output stability, there is largely no con￿ ict between the
two regarding the horizon, since both the house price shock and the credit shock are demand
shocks in the model. The preferred horizon is highly shock-dependent. Speci￿cally, a relatively
short horizon would be preferred in the case of the house price shock, as longer horizons would prove
to be destabilizing. In the case of the credit shock, relatively long horizons are more stabilizing
than relatively short horizons.
Thus, our ￿ndings largely support the conventional approach that concern for ￿nancial stability
can be incorporated in interest rate decisions by choosing a longer horizon than out of concern for
in￿ ation and output stability alone. However, our analysis also suggests that this is not always
the case, as e.g. concern for the debt ratio favors a relatively shorter horizon than that favored by
in￿ ation and output stability alone.
In sum, our results suggest that incorporating concern for ￿nancial stability when setting in-
terest rates under a ￿ exible in￿ ation-targeting regime is a demanding task in terms of the inform-
ation required, irrespective of whether one follows the precautionary approach or the conventional
approach. In particular, it appears crucial to choose appropriate indicator(s) of ￿nancial stability,
especially because di⁄erent indicators may move in opposite directions with widely di⁄erent policy
and economic implications.
Our analysis has brought forward some of the trade-o⁄s that may exist between the objective
of ￿nancial stability and in￿ ation and output stability under the two di⁄erent approaches. These
trade-o⁄s appear even in the face of shocks that can be considered demand shocks. In the case of
supply shocks, a more complex set of trade-o⁄s is likely to emerge, as all of the three objectives
of in￿ ation, output and ￿nancial stability may con￿ ict with each other. These trade-o⁄s and
the possible consequences of imperfect information on the identity of shocks raise the question of
whether the objective of ￿nancial stability should be pursued through interest rates, or whether
20alternative policy instruments would be more appropriate. An exploration of this issue as well as
an examination of our ￿ndings using alternative models is left for future research.
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23Appendix: The macroeconometric model
The model is an extension of the speci￿cations reported in B￿rdsen and Nymoen (2001), B￿rdsen
et al. (2003) and (2005). It is a macroeconometric model estimated on quarterly aggregate data. It
explicitly takes into account several channels of interplay between output, in￿ ation, and ￿nancial
stability. The equations are in equilibrium-correction form, with backward-looking expectations
formation. The model is econometrically well-speci￿ed, with invariant parameters with respect to
changes in monetary policy over the sample; see the citations above for further documentation.
Aggregate demand:
￿yt = 0:5￿gt + 0:05￿(e + p￿ ￿ p)t + 0:1￿(ph ￿ p)t
￿ 0:2[(y + 1:4(r ￿ ￿4p) ￿ 0:5g ￿ 0:1(ph ￿ p)]t￿1 (5)
Household debt:
￿crt = ￿hst + 0:03￿(inc + ph)t ￿ 0:3￿rt + 0:01￿turnt ￿ 0:02￿ut
￿ 0:05[l ￿ hs ￿ 1:7r ￿ 0:2turnt ￿ 0:6s_share]t￿1 ; (6)
House prices:
￿pht = 0:2￿inct + 0:05he
t ￿ 4:5￿rt
￿ 0:1[ph + 5r + 0:4u ￿ 1:5(inc ￿ hs) ￿ 0:15cr]t￿1 ; (7)
Exchange rate:
￿et = ￿0:1(e + p￿ ￿ p)t￿1 ￿ 0:3[(r ￿ ￿4p) ￿ (r ￿ ￿4p￿)]t￿1; (8)
Unemployment:
￿ut = ￿0:1ut￿1 ￿ 2:8￿yt; (9)
Wages:
￿wt = 0:7￿pt ￿ 0:1(w ￿ p ￿ pr + 0:1u)t￿1 ; (10)
Consumer prices:
￿pt = 0:4￿wt + 0:05￿yt ￿ 0:06[p ￿ 0:7(w ￿ pr) ￿ 0:3(e + p￿)]t￿1 ; (11)
Bankruptcies:
￿bt = 2:4￿(w ￿ p ￿ pr)t ￿ 0:8￿(e + p￿ ￿ p)t
￿ 0:6[(b ￿ f) ￿ 9:8(r ￿ ￿4p) + 3:5(w ￿ p ￿ pr) ￿ 0:9(q ￿ p) + 3:4(e + p￿ ￿ p)]t￿1 (12)
We present a stylized version of the model in Equations (5)￿ (12). All variables except nominal
interest rates (r) are in natural logarithms, ￿ denotes the ￿rst di⁄erence operator, ￿4 denotes the
four period di⁄erence operator, and foreign variables are denoted with starred superscripts. The
24nominal exchange rate (in logs denoted e) expresses the number of domestic currency units per
unit of foreign currency.
Growth in aggregate demand ￿y is modeled in Equation (5). Real house prices (ph ￿ p) have
wealth e⁄ects on aggregate demand. In addition, aggregate demand is a⁄ected by the real interest
rate (r￿￿4p), government expenditures g and the real exchange rate (e + p￿ ￿ p). Thus, a change
in the nominal exchange rate would also directly a⁄ect aggregate demand. The relationship ex-
plaining movements in household debt in Equation (6) follows Jacobsen and Naug (2004). Growth
in household debt ￿crt reacts positively to the real value of the housing stock hs, growth in income
inc and house prices ph, as well as to changes in the interest rate r, the turnover rate of houses
turn, the share of young people proxied by students in the population s_share and movements in
the unemployment rate u; see Jacobsen and Naug (2004) for further details.
The model of house prices ph in Equation (7) is based on Jacobsen and Naug (2005). The growth
rate of nominal house prices ￿ph is explained by growth in nominal income inc and household
expectations he regarding own income prospects from survey data as well as interest rate changes
and deviations from steady state. In steady state, real house prices (ph ￿ p)are mainly determined
by income inc and housing stock hs in addition to the interest rate r, the unemployment rate u,
and credit cr.
The equation of growth of the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate ￿e (Equation 8) reacts to
deviations from PPP (e + p￿ ￿ p) and hence contributes to stabilizing the real exchange rate. In
the long run, the nominal exchange rate re￿ ects the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign prices
and the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign interest rates (r ￿ ￿4p)￿(r ￿ ￿4p￿). Accordingly,
domestic in￿ ation becomes fully re￿ ected in the nominal exchange rate in the long run.
The unemployment rate ut follows output growth ￿y in the short run, as in an Okun￿ s law
relationship; see Equation (9). In addition, it exhibits slow reversion towards its equilibrium rate;
an intercept term has been omitted from this equation for ease of exposition.
There is a partial pass-through of consumer price in￿ ation ￿p to nominal wage growth ￿w
in the short run; see Equation (10). In each period, nominal wages adjust towards their long-run
relationship where there is a full pass-through of consumer prices and productivity pr. However,
the mark-up of wages on prices and productivity is inversely related to the unemployment rate.7 In
the short run, consumer price in￿ ation varies with changes in aggregate demand ￿y and to some
extent nominal wage growth ￿w; see Equation (11). In addition, it adjusts to deviations from the
long-run relationship for consumer prices.
In the long run, consumer prices p re￿ ect a weighted average of domestic and imported costs,
represented by unit labor costs (w ￿ pr) and import prices (e + p￿). It follows that the initial
e⁄ect of a nominal exchange rate on aggregate demand would become modi￿ed over time due to
7The constant mark-up term is suppressed. In the full econometric model, productivity pr is also an endogenous
variable that depends on real wages w ￿ p, unemployment u and a deterministic trend.
25the exchange rate pass-through to in￿ ation, which would have an e⁄ect opposite to that of the
nominal exchange rate on the real exchange rate. The model also includes an equation for the
underlying in￿ ation rate (Inf), which is linked to consumer price in￿ ation.
Finally, the model contains a relationship, (12), explaining the number of bankruptcies, adapted
from Jacobsen and Birkeland Kloster (2005). The number of bankruptcies b are modeled as a long-
run relationship with the number of enterprises f, the real interest rate (r ￿ 4￿p), real unit labor
costs (w ￿ p ￿ pr), real material input costs (q ￿ p), and the real exchange rate (e + p￿ ￿ p). In
the short-run the growth rate ￿b reacts to growth rates in unit labor costs and the real exchange
rate.
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